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Abstract  
In recent years we have seen the emergence of “personalised medicine.” This development 
can be seen as the logical product of reductionism in medical science in which disease is 
increasingly understood in molecular terms. Personalised medicine has flourished as a 
consequence of the application of neoliberal principles to health care, whereby a 
commercial and social need for personalised medicine has been created. More specifically, 
personalised medicine benefits from the ongoing commercialisation of the body and of 
genetic knowledge, the idea that health is defined by genetics, and the emphasis the state 
places on individual citizens as being “responsible for” their own health. In this paper I 
critique the emergence of personalised medicine by examining the ways in which it has 
already impacted upon health and health care delivery. 
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Introduction 
Over the past decade, a new approach to health care has emerged—the idea of 
“personalised medicine.” Personalised medicine is defined as the use of genomic and other 
biotechnologies to derive information about an individual that could be used to inform types 
of health interventions that would best suit that individual (Bentley 2004; Burke and Psaty 
2007; Burke et al. 2010; Evans and Khoury 2007; Ginsburg and McCarthy 2001; Guttmacher, 
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Porteous, and McInerney 2007; Hamburg and Collins 2010; Hedgecoe 2004; Katsios and 
Roukos 2010; Khoury 1996; Meyer and Ginsburg 2002; Reardon 2011; Snyderman and 
Sanders Williams 2003; Thrall 2004; Willard, Angrist, and Ginsburg 2005). This information 
can be used by health care providers to tailor therapies for an individual or it can offer 
people information about themselves that they may use to reduce their risk of illness or 
disease and help them maintain or return to a state of good health. This information is 
largely based on a genetic conception of the self, where health is envisioned as “an ideal 
state of freedom from disease, the predominant causes of which are seen to be due to 
‘faults’ in the makeup of the human organism (the genome)” (Petersen 2006, 483). In this 
paper I critique the impact that personalised medicine has had (or may have) on health and 
health care delivery: disrupting the ontology of health, illness, and disease by over-
emphasising the contribution of genetics to each and influencing judgements as to what 
constitutes evidence of health, illness, and disease. I then suggest that personalised 
medicine carries with it a privileging of libertarianism and of the commodification of health 
care that may challenge notions of personal and societal responsibility and create the 
possibility of increasing social inequality.  
 
Personalised Medicine: What Is It and Why Is It a Good Idea? 
Personalised medicine can be defined as the use of genetic knowledge about a patient to 
predict disease development, to influence decisions about lifestyle choice, and/or to tailor 
medical treatment plans/options for that same individual (NHMRC 2011). A personalised 
medicine approach can include, but is not limited to, decisions concerning an individual’s 
response to drugs or the environment, treatment options, and reproductive or lifestyles 
choices (Bentley 2004; Burke and Psaty 2007; Burke et al. 2010; Evans and Khoury 2007; 
Ginsburg and McCarthy 2001; Guttmacher, Porteous, and McInerney 2007; Hamburg and 
Collins 2010; Hedgecoe 2004; Katsios and Roukos 2010; Khoury 1996; Meyer and Ginsburg 
2002; Reardon 2011; Snyderman and Sanders Williams 2003; Thrall 2004; Willard, Angrist, 
and Ginsburg 2005). A central part of this formulation of personalised medicine is the 
reliance on, and necessary involvement of, new biotechnologies—specifically new forms of 
genetic testing. Data from these genetic tests may be provided and interpreted by a health 
care professional or through a direct-to-consumer service provider. Health care has to some 
extent always been personalised, and biological data has long been used to tailor medical 
therapies for diseases and (to a lesser extent) individuals. What sets personalised medicine 
apart is its reliance on the “genetic conception of health” (Petersen 2006), where genetics is 
understood to be an underlying factor in most (if not all) health conditions. While 
personalised medicine assumes the involvement of genetics in the classification, diagnosis, 
and treatment of a range of conditions/diseases, the degree to which genetics is actually 
causative in human disease varies from single gene disorders (such as Huntington’s disease) 
to complex common conditions (such as dementia, diabetes, and heart disease) that are 
likely to emerge as a consequence of the interaction between multiple genetic and 
environmental factors where the exact degree to which genetics is contributory remains 
largely unknown. Irrespective of the degree to which genetic difference is causative in 
different conditions, personalised medicine assumes that there is a contribution from 
genetics and that this must always be considered. Genetic testing and genetic screening, 
therefore, become reified, as they enable the taxonomisation of people according to their 
current—and future—health. Diagnostic testing and screening, however, both rely upon 
robust knowledge about the exact implications of a positive or negative result, and each are 
predicated on the assumption that the information gained from these tests is meaningful 
and actionable. In other words, that the knowledge gained from a screening test will 
produce an assessment of health risk and will enable steps to be taken by an individual or 
the state to return that person to health or to modify the impact of the health risk.  
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In many ways, of course, personalised medicine is exemplary of what medicine aspires to be: 
exact, rigorous, specific, and able to control both disease and the very possibility of death. 
The diagnosis and treatment of breast cancer provides an example of the therapeutic, 
normative, and heuristic power of genetics in medicine. Following the discovery of the genes 
predisposing to breast cancer (the BRCA1 and 2 genes) and other genes that affect the 
structure of treatment regimes for breast cancer patients (e.g., HER2), health care providers’ 
approaches to the treatment and prevention of breast cancer have increasingly been guided 
by the presence or absence of these genes in patients. For example, individuals known to 
have a variant in the BRCA1 and 2 genes associated with a significantly increased chance of 
breast cancer are now able to access preventative therapies (notably mastectomy) and 
screening programs earlier in life. Also, women with breast cancer are now tested to see if 
they have a variant in the HER2 gene—a gene that codes for a cell surface receptor (Slamon 
et al. 1987; Slamon et al. 1989). In some patients, when this cell surface receptor is over-
expressed in their breast cancer tumour cells, they can be treated with a monoclonal 
antibody, trastuzumab (Herceptin®), which has been shown to improve median survival time 
(Baselga et al. 1998; Caremark 1998; Frueh and Gurwitz 2004; Phillips et al. 2004; Slamon et 
al. 2001). Therefore, in some cases of breast cancer, genetic knowledge is used to predict 
disease progression and helps tailor medical treatments that give the patient the best 
chance at recovery and, in some cases, lessens the likelihood of adverse effects of particular 
treatments (Smart, Martin, and Parker 2004).  
 
The goal of personalised medicine, however, is not simply the treatment of patients but the 
prevention and prediction of disease by identification of genetic predispositions; as a result, 
health is obscured by the possibility of illness and now everyone is a “potential patient” 
(Ginsburg and Willard 2009; Law 2006; Moynihan and Cassels 2005; Seshadri et al. 1993). 
Personalised medicine, through the use of genetic testing of people in the absence of signs, 
symptoms, or history of disease or injury, therefore challenges what it means to be healthy.  
 
Personalised Medicine and the Ontology of Health, Illness, and Disease  
Disease has historically been understood in terms of pathological loss of normal, 
physiological function or variance from the “normal.” What is “normal” or “healthy” has, in 
turn, been understood by reference to an a priori assessment of biological normality or by 
reference to a population “norm” or average determined by epidemiological studies 
(Aronowitz 2004; Boorse 1975, 1977; Canguilhem 2004; Tiles 1993). Increasingly, genetics 
offers an “explanation” of who we were, are, or should be to the extent that “matters of 
birth, death, disease, disability and quality of life are increasingly subject to genetic 
interventions” (Miringoff 1991, 6). With personalised medicine, disease (and thereby health) 
is constructed in genetic terms, and thus it is only by knowing one’s genetics that informed 
decisions can be made and interventions designed to return an individual to health. This 
reinforces the idea that genetics is not just a part of one’s health, but central to it. This 
synthesis of genetics and health is implicit (and explicit) in the promotion of personal 
genome testing to consumers (Lupton 1994).  The use of genetics to explain disease not only 
provides an explanation of causation, it also changes the ontology of disease. Illness in this 
respect becomes not so much a matter of experience, but the possibility of developing 
disease according to one’s genetics; genetic variants, or polymorphisms, therefore become 
equivalent to disease and illness. For example, women with the BRCA 1 or 2 mutation or 
men (and women) who test positive for genetic markers of Huntington’s disease are 
perceived as “diseased,” even when they have no symptoms and even when there is a 
possibility that they may never develop symptoms. Disease is no longer inextricably linked to 
symptoms, and the distinction between normal and pathological has shifted from 
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anatomical, pathological, and physiological ideas about species-normal functioning to 
notions of “normal” human genetics (Canguilhem 1989, 2004). Personalised medicine 
reinforces the idea that health, illness, and disease are the object of genetic surveillance of 
the body and self and that people may be classified as healthy or diseased prior to the 
manifestation of symptoms or to their organ function being compromised by disease or 
illness (Foucault 1995). 
 
The genetic redefinition of health and disease implicit in personalised medicine thereby 
carries with it assumptions about the power of genetic knowledge and about an individual’s 
responsibility for his or her health. Responsibility for good health is shifted from government 
and collectives to the individual, such that the individual is now “responsible” for his or her 
health or disease. But while genetic data may enable choice, or at least give the illusion of 
meaningful choice, it may also provide a means for avoiding moral blame. For if an individual 
believes in the deterministic nature of one’s own genetics, he or she may claim to have no 
responsibility for his or her state of health (or by extension, his or her actions associated 
with health). While personalised medicine does not make explicit that people have particular 
moral responsibilities with regard to their future health, it does increase the likelihood that 
people may be judged according to both their genetic susceptibility and, more significantly, 
how they choose to act in response to knowledge about their (likely) future. As a result, 
tension emerges when personalised medicine can be seen to both empower and absolve 
individuals of responsibility with regards to their health. Empirical data from Australia 
illustrates that genetic information about an individual’s disease susceptibility changes the 
way in which individuals perceive themselves and their families and changes the way in 
which others see them (Taylor et al. 2008). Consequently, it is clear that discrimination 
based on genetic grounds may occur in the social, familial, and legal arenas. It is important 
to note, however, that discrimination is not a necessary feature of personalised medicine 
and that “medical” and social discrimination occurs in the absence of genetic data, based on 
physical attributes, beliefs, or lifestyle choices. Smokers, for example, are often judged as 
not being deserving of health care and obese people as culpable for their state of (ill) health. 
Genetic information and classification, therefore, do not create normativity or 
discrimination, they just, as Dr. James Watson has noted, enable it to be done more 
scientifically.  
 
Reframing the Epistemological Foundations of Health Care  
Over the course of the past 20 years, health care has increasingly come to emphasise the use 
of epidemiologically proven treatments for the prevention and treatment of disease 
(Petersen and Bunton 2002). This is a central feature of evidence-based medicine. But while 
medical epistemology has emphasised the importance of populations and quantitative data, 
there has also been broad recognition of the “generalisability gap”—the gap that exists 
between what works in a study situation for a specific population with certain controls 
versus what works for specific individuals in larger, uncontrolled populations (Rychetnik et 
al. 2004). Conventional medicine has never, therefore, completely discounted the centrality 
of the individual or the critical influence that individual factors have on whether a therapy 
works. Despite this, hierarchies of evidence consistently privilege epidemiology, biostatistics, 
and particular methodologies—notably randomised controlled trials (RCT) and systemic 
review with or without meta-analysis. Personalised medicine, however, challenges these 
hierarchies of evidence and the epistemological assumptions that they reflect; it challenges 
the very notion of what constitutes evidence in clinical medicine and public health (Khoury 
2010). For example, when individuals are shown to possess a genetic variant that 
predisposes them to metabolise a drug faster or slower than people who lack a particular 
variant, designing, conducting, or utilising the results of an RCT for that drug becomes 
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complicated and ultimately inappropriate.   In both the research and clinical setting, the 
discriminate nature of personalised medicine requires the division of large populations into 
increasingly small sub-populations defined by the genetic variants they are known to 
possess. This means that evidence of harms and benefits are generalisable only to small 
subsets of the population; that is, to those who possess the genetic variant of interest. The 
problem with this formulation of efficacy, of course, is that while treatments may still be 
“evidence-based,” this is only true for individuals with that variant, meaning in effect that 
many individuals and populations are “orphaned” (in a research sense) and devoid of 
treatment options or recourse to action because they lack a “genetic requirement” (Conti et 
al. 2010; Khoury 2010).  
 
Understanding what research data actually means and applying it to the care of individuals is 
becoming increasingly complex and subject to expert interpretation. This is a particular issue 
for personalised medicine as, in contrast to other forms of diagnostics, genomic testing can 
be publicly accessed via commercial providers through the Internet without clinical referral 
and the results of personal genomic analysis accessed without interpretation or 
contextualisation. How consumers use and understand such information, of course, will vary 
from person to person as the meaning people attach to this information will be a “function 
of their own circumstances and their own views about what is important in their lives” 
(Ormond et al. 2010, 1749). The concern that many have regarding direct-to-consumer 
personal genome testing is that, without a “deeper” or “expert” understanding of the 
meanings and limitations of this information, consumers and patients may make decisions 
that have unintended harms that may result in significant physical, psychological, or social 
consequences (Reardon 2011). However, shifting the ontology of health and disease toward 
a genetically definable state may restrict richer philosophical constructions of health, 
compromise considerations of social determinants of disease, and impoverish thinking about 
responses to threats to clinical and public health. In this way, personalised medicine may 
lead, inevitably, to a reductionist, “anti-social” view of health, illness, and disease, where 
“illness is seen as an inherent failure of the individual rather than an outcome of an 
‘unhealthy’ social or physical environment” (Petersen 2006, 489).  
 
While personalised medicine may seem to be leading toward a reductionist view of life, 
where health and disease is determined primarily by genetic difference, there are also 
burgeoning fields that oppose this shift. One such field is epigenetics, the study of heritable 
alterations in gene expression that are not explained by changes in DNA sequences and that 
may result from complex interactions between genetics, cellular processes, and the 
environment (Hallgrímsson and Hall 2011). While knowledge about genetics and the 
mechanisms that influence control and/or expression of genes has greatly expanded over 
the past 50 years, much less is known about the impact of other factors (such as 
environmental, social, and geographical influences) on gene expression, genetic change, and 
phenotype. In relation to personalised medicine, the insights of epigenetics provide a 
counterbalance to the prevailing notion that all explanations of life lie within the genome 
(Hallgrímsson and Hall 2011).  
   
The Neoliberal Landscape of Personalised Medicine 
The idea that genetic information predictive of future health and disease can, and indeed 
should, be purchased by consumers can best be seen as a manifestation of neoliberalism in 
health—where neoliberalism refers to the (re)privileging of liberal principles, including the 
notion that individuals are atomistic, rational agents whose existence and interests are prior 
to society (Petersen 1996). In this construction, neoliberalist ideology in health care imagines 
patients as rational citizens capable of exercising regulated freedom (Rose and Miller 1992) 
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and self-governance and as being imbued with a right to knowledge and to consumption 
(Reardon 2011).  
 
The rational individual imbued with the right to consume and actively seek out 
information—e.g., genetic information—is also tasked with a new responsibility: a 
responsibility “that one [has] caused one’s health and thus deserves it, just as others 
deserve whatever health they have caused” (Frank 2002, 27). This notion of a healthy person 
as a rational and responsible consumer is entirely consistent with personalised medicine, 
which creates an expectation of, and need for, “personalised” information by promoting the 
idea that individuals have the power to take control of their life and their future (Fairclough 
1993). Personalised medicine, therefore, carries many of the hallmarks of consumerism in 
health in that it creates both a demand and a supply (Leiss 1976), and, at least in the realm 
of the marketplace, personalised medicine cannot profit in the absence of liberal 
constructions of health care. Of necessity, this emphasis on the individual, both in terms of 
the ontology of health and illness and the delivery of health care services, presents a major 
threat to communitarian ideals and the emphasis on “approaches to participation that are 
necessary to advance the health and wellbeing of the population as a whole” (Hogg 1999, 
169-171; Hendersen and Petersen 2002, 3). This, in turn, raises larger questions regarding 
the impact that personalised medicine may have on equity and social justice.  
 
Equity, Justice, and Personalised Medicine 
Given the capacity for any system of health care to reduce or increase inequity, one must 
question the extent to which a personalised approach to health care should be supported 
and funded. In this regard it is worth noting that, while personalised medicine appears to 
emphasise autonomy, in reality it may simply privilege consumption. For, as others have 
noted, “the consumption of particular health-related goods and services is shaped not 
simply by perceived health benefits (improved health), but also by their associations with 
particular images, lifestyles and tastes” (Hendersen and Petersen 2002, 3).  As a result, the 
autonomous rational ‘consumer’ of health care promoted by personalised medicine may, 
therefore, simply be an artefact of culture, expertise, and the health-marketing system 
(Grace 1991, 1994; Frank 2000; Frank 2002), and, because personalised medicine is most 
accessible to those with money and thus the capacity to purchase goods and services, it is 
entirely possible that it may ultimately erode notions of universal care, increase health 
inequities, and lead to further injustice for those already without a voice, further 
disempowering those who already lack access to health care. This is true both for individuals 
who may lack the capacity to purchase or understand genetic bio-knowledge (and the 
products to which it is linked) and for populations who may lack the biomarker to be a 
“population of interest” (Petersen 2009). 
 
Personalised medicine, by definition, is concerned primarily with the individual (Lunshof 
2006). But personalised medicine relies upon epidemiological data derived from large 
populations and from genomic biobanks. This creates something of a paradox in that 
personalised medicine requires the involvement of many. This in turn raises important 
questions about public participation in science and the goals of health care and equity. For if 
personalised medicine relies upon populations contributing data and bio-specimens, then it 
would seem appropriate that the public should expect to benefit from the insights of 
personalised medicine and that the “goods” of personalised medicine should be accessible 
and should be distributed justly and fairly (Lunshof 2006).  
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Conclusion 
Personalised medicine is often framed as an apolitical and an acultural development in 
biomedical science that provides the possibility of “personal” care for all. In public health 
terms, it is more accurate to suggest that it may simply promote the consumption of health 
information and health care by wealthy, active, and health-conscious citizens who are 
already involved in their health care. However, rather than promoting autonomy and 
agency, personalised medicine has the potential to impoverish notions of identity and health 
(because everyone is now at risk of disease or pre-symptomatically ill) and constrain agency 
(for one cannot choose not to act when in possession of such powerful bio-knowledge). 
Furthermore, by making health care (and disease) the responsibility of the individual, 
personalised medicine may actually absolve the state from responsibility for its citizens’ 
health, thereby exacerbating current health inequities by its blindness to social, economic, 
and environmental determinants of health.  
 
The challenge for those charged with delivering just health care is that it is certain that 
personalised medicine will increasingly shape understandings of health and disease and 
shape both therapeutics and systems of evidence. Personalised medicine, therefore, raises 
profound ontological and epistemic questions about health care. Furthermore, it also raises 
profound moral questions for medicine, public health, and bioethics—in part because it 
alters the relationship between the individual and the community, in part because it frames 
the responsibilities of the individual and the state in particular terms, and in part because it 
is so much a function of the medical marketplace and so much a product of the tenets of 
neoliberalism.  
 
 
Acknowledgements Thank you to the Australasian Association of Bioethics and Health Law 
(AABHL) for this distinguished award, the Max Charlesworth Prize in Bioethics, and for 
assistance with attending the 2011 AABHL conference. Also to Professor Ian Kerridge and Dr 
Wendy Lipworth, thank you for your time and patience with editing and for providing 
constructive feedback on drafts of this manuscript. 
 
 
References 
 
Aronowitz, R.A. 2004. When Do Symptoms Become a Disease? In Health, Disease and Illness: 
Concpets in Medicine, edited by A. Caplan, J. J. McCartney and D. A. Sisti. 
Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press. 
Baselga, J., L. Norton, J. Albanell, Y.M. Kim, and J. Mendelsohn. 1998. Recombinant 
humanized anti-HER2 antibody (Herceptin™) enhances the antitumor activity of 
paclitaxel and doxorubicin against HER2/neu overexpressing human breast cancer 
xenografts. Cancer research 58 (13):2825. 
Bentley, D.R. 2004. Genomes for medicine. Nature 429 (6990):440-445. 
Boorse, C. 1975. On the distinction between disease and illness. Philosophy & public affairs 5 
(1):49-68. 
8 
 
———. 1977. Health as a theoretical concept. Philosophy of science:542-573. 
Burke, W., H. Burton, A.E. Hall, M. Karmali, M.J. Khoury, B. Knoppers, E.M. Meslin, F. Stanley, 
C.F. Wright, and R.L. Zimmern. 2010. Extending the reach of public health genomics: 
What should be the agenda for public health in an era of genome-based and 
“personalized” medicine? Genetics in Medicine 12 (12):785. 
Burke, W., and B.M. Psaty. 2007. Personalized medicine in the era of genomics. JAMA: The 
Journal of the American Medical Association 298 (14):1682. 
Canguilhem, G. 1989. The normal and the pathological. 
———. 2004. The Normal and the Pathological - Introduction to the Problem. In Health, 
Disease and Illness: Concepts in Medicine, edited by A. Caplan, J. J. McCartney and D. 
A. Sisti. Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press. 
Caremark, Inc. 1998. Biotechnology breakthrough in breast cancer wins FDA approval. New 
Drug Review, Caremark New Drug Quick-Facts 1 (11). 
Conti, R., D.L. Veenstra, K. Armstrong, L.J. Lesko, and S.D. Grosse. 2010. Personalized 
medicine and genomics: challenges and opportunities in assessing effectiveness, 
cost-effectiveness, and future research priorities. Medical Decision Making 30 
(3):328-340. 
Evans, J., and M.J. Khoury. 2007. Evidence based medicine meets genomic medicine. 
Genetics in Medicine 9 (12):799. 
Fairclough, N. 1993. Critical discourse analysis and the marketization of public discourse: the 
universities. Discourse & Society 4 (2):133-168. 
Foucault, M. 1995. Discipline and Punish: the Birth of the Prison. Translated by A. Sheridan. 
Second Vintage Books Edition ed. New York: Random House. 
Frank, A. W. 2002. What' s wrong with consumerism? In Consuming health: the 
commodification of healthcare, edited by S. Henderson and A. Petersen. London & 
New York: Routledge. 
Frank, A.W. 2000. All the things which do not fit: Baudrillard and medical consumerism. 
Families, Systems, & Health 18 (2):205. 
9 
 
Frueh, F.W., and D. Gurwitz. 2004. From pharmacogenetics to personalized medicine: a vital 
need for educating health professionals and the community. Pharmacogenomics 5 
(5):571-579. 
Ginsburg, G.S., and J.J. McCarthy. 2001. Personalized medicine: revolutionizing drug 
discovery and patient care. TRENDS in Biotechnology 19 (12):491-496. 
Ginsburg, G.S., and H.F. Willard. 2009. Genomic and personalized medicine: foundations and 
applications. Translational research 154 (6):277-287. 
Grace, V.M. 1991. The marketing of empowerment and the construction of the health 
consumer: A critique of health promotion. International Journal of Health Services 21 
(2):329-343. 
———. 1994. What is a health consumer? In Just health: inequality in illness, care and 
prevention, edited by C. Waddell and A. Petersen. Melbourne: Churchill Livingston. 
Guttmacher, A.E., M.E. Porteous, and J.D. McInerney. 2007. Educating health-care 
professionals about genetics and genomics. Nature Reviews Genetics 8 (2):151-157. 
Hallgrímsson, B., and B.K. Hall. 2011. Epigenetics: Linking Genotype and Phenotype in 
Development and Evolution: Univ of California Pr. 
Hamburg, M.A., and F.S. Collins. 2010. The path to personalized medicine. New England 
Journal of Medicine 363 (4):301-304. 
Hedgecoe, A. 2004. The politics of personalised medicine: pharmacogenetics in the clinic. 
New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Hendersen, S., and A. Petersen. 2002. Consuming health: the commodification of healthcare. 
London & New York: Routledge. 
Hogg, C. 1999. Patients, power and politics: from patients to citizens. London: Sage. 
Katsios, Christos, and Dimitrios H. Roukos. 2010. Individual genomes and personalized 
medicine: life diversity and complexity.(Editorial). Personalized Medicine 7 
(4):347(4). 
Khoury, M.J. 1996. From genes to public health: the applications of genetic technology in 
disease prevention. Genetics Working Group. American Journal of Public Health 86 
(12):1717. 
10 
 
Khoury, MJ. 2010. Dealing with the evidence dilemma in genomics and personalized 
medicine. Clinical Pharmacology & Therapeutics 87 (6):635-638. 
Law, Jacky. 2006. Big Pharma: how the world's biggest drug companies control illness. 
London: Constable & Robinson Ltd. 
Leiss, W. 1976. The limits to satisfaction: an essay on the problem of needs and commodities. 
Toronto: University of Toronto Press. 
Lunshof, Jeantine E. 2006. Personalized medicine: new perspectives - new ethics? 
Personalized Medicine 3 (2):187+. 
Lupton, D. 1994. Consumerism, commodity culture and health promotion. Health Promotion 
International 9 (2):111. 
Meyer, J.M., and G.S. Ginsburg. 2002. The path to personalized medicine. Current opinion in 
chemical biology 6 (4):434-438. 
Miringoff, M.L. 1991. The social costs of genetic welfare. New Brunswick, New Jersey: 
Rutgers University Press New Brunswick. 
Moynihan, R., and A. Cassels. 2005. Selling Sickness: how drug companies are turning us all 
into patients. Crows Nest, NSW: Allen & Unwin. 
NHMRC. 2011. Personalised medicine and genetics. NHMRC, 4 July 2011 2011 [cited 21 
December 2011 2011]. 
Ormond, K.E., M.T. Wheeler, L. Hudgins, T.E. Klein, A.J. Butte, R.B. Altman, E.A. Ashley, and 
H.T. Greely. 2010. Challenges in the clinical application of whole-genome 
sequencing. Lancet 375 (9727):1749-1751. 
Petersen, A. 1996. The new public health: a new morality. In The New Public Health: health 
and self in the age of risk, edited by A. a. Petersen and D. Lupton. St Leonards, NSW: 
Allen & Unwin. 
———. 2006. The genetic conception of health: is it as radical as claimed? Health: 10 (4):481. 
———. 2009. The ethics of expectations: biobanks and the promise of personalised 
medicine. Monash bioethics review 28 (1):5.1. 
11 
 
Petersen, A.R., and R. Bunton. 2002. The new genetics and the public's health. London & 
New York: Routledge. 
Phillips, K.A., D.L. Veenstra, S.D. Ramsey, S.L. Van Bebber, and J. Sakowski. 2004. Genetic 
testing and pharmacogenomics: issues for determining the impact to healthcare 
delivery and costs. Am J Manag Care 10 (7):425-432. 
Reardon, J. 2011. The ‘persons’ and ‘genomics’ of personal genomics. Personalized Medicine 
8 (1):95-107. 
Rose, N., and P. Miller. 1992. Political power beyond the state: problematics of government. 
The British journal of sociology 43 (2):173-205. 
Rychetnik, L., P. Hawe, E. Waters, A. Barratt, and M. Frommer. 2004. A glossary for evidence 
based public health. Journal of Epidemiology and Community Health 58 (7):538. 
Seshadri, R., FA Firgaira, DJ Horsfall, K. McCaul, V. Setlur, and P. Kitchen. 1993. Clinical 
significance of HER-2/neu oncogene amplification in primary breast cancer. The 
South Australian Breast Cancer Study Group. Journal of Clinical Oncology 11 
(10):1936-1942. 
Slamon, D.J., G.M. Clark, S.G. Wong, W.J. Levin, A. Ullrich, and W.L. McGuire. 1987. Human 
breast cancer: correlation of relapse and survival with amplification of the HER-
2/neu oncogene. Science 235 (4785):177. 
Slamon, D.J., W. Godolphin, L.A. Jones, J.A. Holt, S.G. Wong, D.E. Keith, W.J. Levin, S.G. 
Stuart, J. Udove, and A. Ullrich. 1989. Studies of the HER-2/neu proto-oncogene in 
human breast and ovarian cancer. Science 244 (4905):707. 
Slamon, D.J., B. Leyland-Jones, S. Shak, H. Fuchs, V. Paton, A. Bajamonde, T. Fleming, W. 
Eiermann, J. Wolter, and M. Pegram. 2001. Use of chemotherapy plus a monoclonal 
antibody against HER2 for metastatic breast cancer that overexpresses HER2. New 
England Journal of Medicine 344 (11):783-792. 
Smart, A., P. Martin, and M. Parker. 2004. Tailored medicine: whom will it fit? The ethics of 
patient and disease stratification. Bioethics 18 (4):322-343. 
Snyderman, R., and R. Sanders Williams. 2003. Prospective medicine: the next health care 
transformation. Academic Medicine 78 (11):1079. 
Taylor, S., S. Treloar, K. Barlow-Stewart, M. Stranger, and M. Otlowski. 2008. Investigating 
genetic discrimination in Australia: a large-scale survey of clinical genetics clients. 
Clinical Genetics 74 (1):20-30. 
12 
 
Thrall, J.H. 2004. Personalized Medicine1. Radiology 231 (3):613-616. 
Tiles, M. 1993. The normal and pathological: The concept of a scientific medicine. The British 
journal for the philosophy of science 44 (4):729-742. 
Willard, H.F., M. Angrist, and G.S. Ginsburg. 2005. Genomic medicine: genetic variation and 
its impact on the future of health care. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal 
Society B: Biological Sciences 360 (1460):1543-1550. 
 
 
